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STEALTH BATTLES OVER CIVIL RIGHTS: 
TWO APPROACHES TO LOW-VISIBILITY CIVIL 
RIGHTS LITIGATION 
Elspeth M. Wilson1 
ALISON L. GASH, BELOW THE RADAR: HOW SILENCE CAN SAVE CIVIL 
RIGHTS (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 280. HARDCOVER $51. 
 
SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (OXFORD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2015). PP. 320. HARDCOVER $105.00. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex 
marriage is protected under the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment overturning bans on same-sex marriage in fifteen states.2 
Immediately following Justice Anthony Kennedy’s announcement of his 5-4 majority 
opinion, the Court’s decision went viral. A crew of reporters from major cable broadcast 
networks covered the breaking news live from the steps of the Supreme Court, with 
activists waving rainbow flags and equality signs celebrating in the background. Social 
media exploded with #SCOTUS hashtags.3 In an impromptu speech from the Rose Garden 
the same morning, President Barack Obama announced that the Supreme Court had issued 
a momentous civil rights ruling, which “reaffirmed” the bedrock principle “that all 
Americans are entitled to equal protection of the law.”4 The White House lit up that 
evening in rainbow colors to celebrate this “victory for America,”5 while state officials 
scrambled to issue public statements expressing either support or opposition to the ruling, 
                                                          
 1. Assistant Professor of Government, Franklin & Marshall College. 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
 3. See A Social Media Snapshot: Public Opinion, Marriage Equality, and the Supreme Court, 
SKDKNICKERBOCKER.COM (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.skdknick.com/a-social-media-snapshot-public-opinion-
marriage-equality-and-the-supreme-court/. 
 4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Supreme Court Decision on Marriage 
Equality, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV (June 26, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/06/26/remarks-president-supreme-court-decision-marriage-equality. 
 5. Id. 
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but generally careful to declare that they would abide by this new law of the land.6 The 
outcome of Obergefell, wrote Professor Erwin Chemerinsky the following day on 
SCOTUSblog.com, “is the Court playing exactly the role that it should in society: 
protecting those who have been traditionally discriminated against and extending to them 
a right long regarded as fundamental.”7 
The two books under review here address a timely and important question from 
different angles: What is the relationship between public visibility and the current 
trajectory of civil rights litigation? As the example of Obergefell illustrates, news travels 
quickly in our digital age, marked by a 24/7 news cycle, social media, and the blogosphere. 
I opened this review with the example of Obergefell because the recent successes of the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement sparked renewed discussion 
about the “rights revolution” and American society.8 Yet Obergefell is just one example 
of the constant stream of media coverage of big political events—including warnings about 
impending national or international crises—commanding the attention of the American 
public. From the standpoint of most Americans today, politics seems more visible and 
sensational than ever, particularly with the advent of the controversial “Twitter 
Presidency” of Donald J. Trump.9 But despite the hyper-visibility of landmark cases such 
as Obergefell, both Alison Gash10 and Sarah Staszak11 persuasively argue that we cannot 
grasp the landscape of civil rights in America today without also paying attention to what 
happens outside the public eye, or as Gash puts it “below-the-radar.”12 
In these two excellent books, Gash and Staszak maintain that there is another quieter 
and far less visible dimension of civil rights jurisprudence, which can be just as important 
in shaping the access to justice available to vulnerable citizens, on the one hand, and their 
chances of success in court, on the other.  In different ways and using diverging 
approaches, they each shine a light on the subterranean politics of civil rights in the United 
States. By highlighting low-visibility forms of civil rights judicial policy-making, these 
books contribute in varying ways to the recent proliferation of work on hidden 
government, most prominently spearheaded by Suzanne Mettler (in The Submerged State: 
How Invisible Policies Undermine American Democracy).13 But while Mettler focuses on 
                                                          
 6. See Audrey Ann Faber & Maresa Strano, State Executive Responses to Obergefell v. Hodges, 
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, https://ballotpedia.org/State_executive_responses_to_Obergefell_v._Hodges (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2018). 
 7. Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium, A Landmark Victory for Civil Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-a-landmark-victory-for-civil-rights/. 
 8. E.g., Robert S. Salem, Intimate Integration: Lessons from the LGBT Civil Rights Movement, 45 CAP U. 
L. REV. 33, 33–34 (2016); Jan Larson, Marriage Equality Movement Found Inspiration in the 1960s Civil Rights 
Movement, UWEC.EDU (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.uwec.edu/news/news/marriage-equality-movement-found-
inspiration-in-1960s-civil-rights-movement-779/. 
 9. See Gregory Korte, Trump and the Twitter Presidency: @realDonaldTrump’s Tweets Often Carry Legal 
Weight, USATODAY.COM (November 8, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/ 
11/08/trump-and-twitter-presidency-realdonaldtrumps-tweets-often-carry-legal-weight/815980001/. 
 10. See ALISON L. GASH, BELOW THE RADAR: HOW SILENCE CAN SAVE CIVIL RIGHTS (2015). 
 11. See SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
RETRENCHMENT (2015). 
 12. GASH, supra note 10, at 12. 
 13. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4, 7 (2011). 
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federal tax policy and other federal bureaucratic programs in which the role of government 
in providing fiscal benefits appears largely invisible to most Americans, Gash and Staszak 
turn to the realm of the judiciary, exposing important subterranean features of civil rights 
litigation. Both scholars agree that we must look beyond “grand acts of politics”14—or 
highly visible landmark civil rights cases like Obergefell—to more accurately understand 
the state of civil rights in contemporary America.   
The differences between these two books are as noteworthy as their similarities. 
While Staszak’s top-down approach emphasizes the threat that judicial retrenchment by 
elites in government poses to civil rights, Gash presents a more hopeful bottom-up account 
of creative activists and lawyers using low-visibility strategies to win civil rights victories 
for vulnerable citizens. Together, these books bolster our understanding of the uneven 
terrain of civil rights in America and shed new light on the shifting opportunities of 
vulnerable Americans seeking justice in court. 
THE SUBTERRANEAN ASSAULT ON CIVIL RIGHTS: EXAMINING TOP-DOWN JUDICIAL 
RETRENCHMENT 
Sarah Staszak, in No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of Judicial 
Retrenchment, offers a top-down account of elites in government engaging in efforts to 
scale back access to federal courts in the wake of the rights revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s.15 Taking an historical institutionalist approach, Staszak presents two main 
questions: “First, what explains the politics of institutional retrenchment in the judiciary? 
Second, what does it look like, and when and why is it more likely to occur?”16 Staszak 
examines judicial retrenchment as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in her effort 
to shed light on these questions, offering a detailed and insightful analysis of procedural 
retrenchment within the federal judiciary. In this section, I summarize the main points of 
her study and end by addressing its implications for the future of civil rights litigation in 
contemporary America. 
Let us begin with the rights revolution. Staszak introduces her puzzle of judicial 
retrenchment by comparing the contemporary Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence 
to that of the Court during the “rights revolution.”17 Beginning in the 1950s with the 
Warren Court—and extending through the Burger Court of the 1960s and 1970s—the 
United States underwent what is now commonly referred to as the “rights revolution.”18 
The rights revolution involved expanding governmental protection for vulnerable 
individuals and disadvantaged groups in the nation, and one of the most important 
mechanisms for accomplishing this was through a massive expansion of judicial power. 
                                                          
 14. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 7, 217. 
 15. Id. at 7. 
 16. Id. at 8. 
 17. Id. at 1–8, 15. 
 18. See CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); SAMUEL WALKER, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RIGHTS AND THE 
COMMUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA (1998); MARK TUSHNET, The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century, 
in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); 
MICHAEL MCCANN, How the Supreme Court Matters in American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives, in 
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Gilman & Clayton 
eds., 1999). 
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For instance, during the African-American Civil Rights Movement, the federal courts not 
only heard record numbers of racial antidiscrimination cases, but the federal judiciary also 
assumed increasing power to interpret statutory laws (most notably: the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965), and to make and enact public policy and oversee 
governmental institutions (e.g. particularly in the realms of school desegregation, busing, 
and voting rights cases). At the same time, federal judges took on a more prominent role 
in protecting minorities and women against workplace discrimination, strengthening 
constitutional protections for freedom of speech, press, and religion, the administration of 
welfare, expanded environmental protections, and even discovering a fundamental right to 
privacy covering reproduction, birth control, and abortion in the Constitution.19 In sum, 
during this relatively short period of time, in which all three branches appeared to support 
expanding access to justice for hitherto excluded individuals and groups, we gained a 
“vastly broadened and empowered institutional judiciary,” which Staszak emphasizes 
remains “a centerpiece of the modern American state.”20 
In light of recent civil rights victories like Obergefell, we might (upon cursory 
glance) assume that the “rights revolution” has not necessarily ended. However, rather 
than focus on major substantive rights decisions that attract widespread news coverage and 
visibility, Staszak suggests that the battleground over civil rights frequently happens in the 
much less visible arena of rule-making and procedural reform regulating who has access 
to the courts and under what conditions. Following legal theorist Dahlia Lithwick, Staszak 
refers to the substantive landmark civil rights cases as “Type A” stories, and labels the 
less-visible procedural developments as “Type B” stories.21 She focuses on identifying 
and elucidating “Type B” examples of judicial retrenchment. Describing the common 
wisdom regarding the “Type A” causes of retrenchment, Staszak notes that “[w]e are now 
intimately familiar with the story of how, in recent decades, an increasingly conservative 
Supreme Court has used its authority in an attempt to scale back the developments of the 
New Deal and Civil Rights eras, and of conservative activists regularly lobbying Congress 
to do the same.”22 In contrast to this intensely partisan account, she posits that, “it is 
essential to recognize that change in the more ‘subterranean’ hidden realm of procedural 
rules is where actual construction in the availability of access to courts frequently 
occurs.”23 
Consider a prominent example of a recent “Type B” case, involving class action 
lawsuits. In 2011 in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
                                                          
 19. The landmark cases associated with this shift in judicial power are legendary: Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 245, 249–50 (1962) (embracing the principle of “one man, one vote”); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495, 506–07 (1965) (establishing a fundamental right to privacy covering the use of 
birth control by married couples); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (the first case extending equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to gender); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164, 166 (1973) (declaring that the 
right to privacy in reproduction encompassed the right of a woman to decide whether or not to have an abortion 
in the first two trimesters of her pregnancy); and of course the list goes on. 
 20. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 5. 
 21. Id. at 3 (crediting Dalia Lithwick for the Type A and B distinction); see also Lithwick, Comments 
presented at Princeton University on Full Court Press: The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public 
Understanding. 
 22. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 4. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
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Circuit’s decision to certify the largest class action lawsuit in history. It did so on purely 
procedural grounds.24 The initial plaintiff in this case was Betty Dukes, an employee of a 
Wal-Mart in California for seven years.25 During her employment at Wal-Mart, Dukes 
was regularly passed over for raises and promotions, which instead went to male 
coworkers with less experience, despite her positive job performance reviews. She was not 
alone in her experience as a female employee at Wal-Mart. While women made up 70 
percent of Wal-Mart’s total employees, they represented less than a third of management 
and often received lower pay for doing exactly the same job.26 Dukes maintained that Wal-
Mart was violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because the company fostered 
a nationwide corporate culture that condoned widespread workplace discrimination 
against women.27 As her lawsuit developed, 1.6 million other women, who currently 
worked or had worked for Wal-Mart stores, joined Dukes in the lawsuit filing for 
certification as a class due to their shared experience of sex discrimination by the company. 
This case against Wal-Mart looked a lot like major anti-discrimination class action 
lawsuits of the recent past.28 Indeed, speaking of the key role of class action lawsuits in 
protecting civil rights of historically marginalized groups during the rights revolution, 
Staszak emphasizes that, 
The class action lawsuit has been a long-standing vehicle for rights activism in the 
courts, leading to major victories aimed at rooting out discrimination in a range of different 
settings, from schools to police departments to corporations like AT&T, Denny’s, and 
United Steel. Historically, class actions have proven to be a potent mechanism for 
changing practices related to hiring and firing, pay, workplace culture, and diversity in the 
workforce, and have also at times required companies to dole out large sums of back pay 
and damages to compensate for their discriminatory practices.29 
However, in its 2011 Wal-Mart ruling, the Court refused to certify the women as a 
class, throwing out the case on procedural grounds without even reaching the point of 
considering the substantive merits of whether or not Wal-Mart discriminated based on 
sex.30 Engaging in its gatekeeping function, the Court held that each woman’s claim of 
discrimination happened at an individual level (i.e. was unique to its own specific context), 
rendering the claims of sex discrimination too dissimilar to meet the requirements of a 
single class action claim.31 This ruling, according to Staszak, was not only “a dramatic 
departure from the driving motivations for creating the class action suit in the first place”—
which expanded during the rights revolution to make it easier for vulnerable groups to 
challenge systemic concerns like workplace discrimination—but “it will no doubt also 
constrain the ability of similar litigants to join together in a class action” to challenge 
                                                          
 24. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359–60 (2011). 
 25. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 16. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 91. During the civil rights revolution, legislators in the mid-1960s spearheaded several reforms, 
including the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to help “enable diverse sets 
of litigants to present themselves as a group in court,” so that lawyers could more easily “represent them in a 
single case.” Id. 
 29. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
 30. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359–60 (2011). 
 31. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 115. 
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systematic cases of discrimination in the future.32 In other words, this procedural ruling—
throwing out the largest class action lawsuit in history against America’s biggest employer 
for discriminating against its female employees—is arguably just as important (if not more 
so) than classic landmark substantive civil rights cases. Betty Dukes—and her 1.6 million 
fellow plaintiffs—never got their day in court. 
The 2011 Wal-Mart case stands out as being one of the best known recent procedural 
civil rights cases, yet it is merely part of a much wider trend towards judicial retrenchment 
in access to federal courts. As Staszak points out, the contemporary statistics involving 
these Type B cases are striking. Although the rates of civil rights litigation “skyrocketed 
in the 1950s and 1960s as landmark civil rights legislation provided new causes of action 
for the ‘have nots’ to have their day in court,” the trend has radically reversed in the last 
twenty years.33 In her words, “litigation rates decreased dramatically in the 1990s and 
2000s,” which effectively means that the doors to the courthouse are increasingly shut to 
vulnerable and disadvantaged individuals and groups.34 Indeed, as Marc Galanter finds in 
his important article on the “vanishing trial,” the percentage of federal cases that make it 
to trial shrank from 11.5% to only 1.8% in the forty years from 1962 to 2002, declining 
most precipitously by 60% from 1985 to the early 2000s.35 Against this backdrop of the 
vanishing trial, Staszak seeks to shed light on the political changes and developments that 
led to this judicial retrenchment, whereby it has become harder and harder for 
disadvantaged groups to seek justice in court.36 
In her analysis of judicial retrenchment, Staszak looks at four case studies of judicial 
change over time, each of which occupies its own chapter (Chapters 3-6). Her case studies 
are informative and detailed accounts of different avenues of procedural “subterranean” 
judicial change occurring within government, focusing on how these issues have 
developed from the 1800s to the present. First is “Changing the Decision Makers,” which 
traces the “proliferation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices that have 
frequently empowered nonjudicial actors to resolve legal grievances in the place of 
judges.”37 Second, she offers a case study on “Changing the Rules,” tracing struggles over 
time between the three branches of national government, interest groups, and professional 
groups like the American Bar Association (ABA) to draft and amend the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.38 The struggle over rule-making focuses less on partisan ideology, on 
Staszak’s account, and more on a power struggle between the branches of government to 
control the rules of the game. Her third case study, “Changing the Venue,” examines the 
advent of the “administrative state” during the early twentieth century, and the turn 
towards adjudication within agencies rather than by judges in federal court.39 Finally, in 
her fourth case study, “Changing the Incentives,” Staszak turns to recent cases constraining 
                                                          
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 6–7. 
 34. Id. at 7. 
 35. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
 36. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 19 (discussing Galanter’s findings). 
 37. Id. at 8. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 118. 
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the incentives for individuals to take their claims to court by focusing on doctrines 
restricting remedies available to individuals even if they win their case.40 For instance, 
when the Court grants government officials immunity from liability, such as police officers 
or public school teachers—thereby restricting the availability of remedies for damages 
suffered by individuals even if the government violated their constitutional rights—they 
effectively eliminate the incentive for litigation. Without the possibility of a remedy, 
access to justice inevitably suffers. 
Returning to the two questions mentioned earlier, Staszak provides a theory in her 
second chapter to explain her findings about judicial retrenchment in her four case studies. 
In this theory, she emphasizes that the three main variables explaining judicial 
retrenchment are insularity, ideology, and temporality.41 It is important to highlight that 
this is not a simple theory, precisely because its purpose is to illustrate just how 
complicated judicial retrenchment tends to be in American politics, both past and present. 
In fact, she uses these three concepts to problematize and challenge our conventional 
wisdom about the causes and texture of judicial retrenchment. For instance, while it is 
conventional wisdom that judicial retrenchment is largely the result of a conservative 
backlash against an activist Supreme Court during the rights revolution—with the 
Republican Party under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s aligning against 
controversial civil rights rulings, such as Roe v. Wade in 197342—Staszak argues that the 
forces driving judicial retrenchment over time cannot be reduced to simple stories of 
“regime politics”—a popular framework for public law scholars analyzing American 
political development.43 Instead, by tracing the path dependent nature of judicial 
retrenchment in each of her case studies in time (temporality), she provides an account that 
is complex and not reducible to mere partisanship (or ideology alone). Rather than focusing 
on dominant (ideological) regimes that seek to shape the judiciary as part of their political 
party ideological coalitions, her analysis directs our attention to a more complicated 
account of “multiple coalitions, promoting different goals and interests, which have 
changed over time.”44 By taking advantage of their discretion and institutional autonomy 
(insularity), various political actors seek to advance a host of different ideological and 
structural goals through altering the “rules of the game” pertaining to the federal judiciary 
with little to no threat of public backlash in this arena.45 In this vein, Staszak argues that 
the explanation for judicial retrenchment rests not in the arena of “landmark” civil rights 
                                                          
 40. Id. at 164. 
 41. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 34–37. Specifically, insularity refers to governing elites having a great deal 
of discretion and autonomy, or being insulated from public reproach and outside influences, to shape the rules of 
the game. Ideology refers to partisan and other ideological commitments of governing elites, which Staszak 
acknowledges sometimes explains efforts at retrenchment but emphasizes that bipartisan coalitions are frequently 
much more successful and responsible to these reforms. Finally, temporality refers to the path dependent nature 
of judicial retrenchment, whereby administrative procedures initially created by New Deal liberals to expand 
access to dispute resolution at a time in which courts were unsympathetic to civil rights and labor claims can set 
the groundwork for being flipped on its head to keep litigants out of court after the right revolution. 
 42. 410 U.S. 113, 164, 166 (1973) (declaring that the right to privacy in reproduction encompassed the right 
of a woman to decide whether or not to have an abortion in the first two trimesters of her pregnancy). 
 43. STASZAK, supra note 11, at 22–24 (discussing her divergence from the “regime politics” APD approach). 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. at 34–35. 
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it to court in the first place, whether their case is heard, and whether they have access to a 
cases like Obergefell, but rather in the “subterranean” realm of procedural and rule reform.  
Although rarely the primary focus of civil rights scholars, this arena determines who makes 
it to court in the first place, whether their case is heard, and whether they have access to a 
judicial remedy. 
Staszak’s thoughtful book makes a number of important contributions to the 
literature on law and courts and American political development (APD).46 By viewing 
judicial retrenchment through the APD lens of historical change, Staszak is able to reveal 
a much more nuanced and path dependent account of procedural evolution, which 
pinpoints fallacies in our contemporary assumptions about the origins and causes of 
retrenchment. Moreover, while public law scholars often sideline procedural issues in 
favor of focusing on more substantive civil rights, Staszak does an excellent job shedding 
light on the importance of procedure in civil rights rulings. Her historical institutionalist 
approach is nuanced and informative, and her theory (of insularity, ideology, and 
temporarily) helps explain her empirical findings in a manner that persuasively challenges 
conventional wisdom. 
Despite these overwhelming strengths, Staszak’s book at times seems to miss the 
forest for the trees by intentionally seeking out complexity rather than searching for 
common patterns over time. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this approach, 
but one downside is that she goes to great lengths to highlight the contingent aspects of 
judicial retrenchment at the expense of drawing attention to the work of partisan regimes. 
Given that her own evidence confirms a broader pattern of conservative backlash against 
the rights revolution in the last twenty-five years, this drives her to minimize a particularly 
important explanatory pattern. Nonetheless, Staszak convincingly makes the case that 
procedure matters at least as much as substance when it comes to civil rights litigation. 
Her focus on elite top-down judicial retrenchment raises serious concerns about the future 
of access to justice and shines a light on a stealth assault on civil rights in America today. 
STEALTH ADVOCACY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: BOTTOM-UP CIVIL RIGHTS CAMPAIGNS 
In Below the Radar: How Silence Can Save Civil Rights, Alison Gash presents a 
bottom-up account of low-visibility civil rights tactics pursued by vulnerable groups 
seeking to secure equal status in American society.47 Both books under review share a 
core theme of examining low-visibility tactics within the realm of civil rights and the 
judiciary. But while Staszak addresses the role that elites play in hindering civil rights 
through subterranean tactics of judicial retrenchment, Gash argues that subterranean 
tactics can also be used to advance civil rights.  She offers a fascinating twist on low-
visibility judicial policy-making, suggesting that this strategy can serve as an effective 
political tool for vulnerable groups and thus (as her title suggests) might even “save” civil 
rights in America. 
Gash, like Staszak, identifies the “rights revolution” as a benchmark for considering 
                                                          
 46. For a general introduction to the APD literature, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE 
SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004). 
 47. See GASH, supra note 10. 
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the relationship between visibility and civil rights in contemporary America.48 After the 
judicial successes of the rights revolution, conventional wisdom has normalized ‘a politics 
of visibility’ as a vital ingredient for civil rights advocacy. For instance, through high-
visibility court cases and public protest, marginalized groups, including African 
Americans and women, were able to spark a national debate about their place in society, 
win over public opinion, and alter both statutory law and constitutional interpretation over 
time.49 On the benefits of visibility, Gash writes: 
Visibility can help plant an issue firmly on the legislative agenda or open windows 
for a policy dialogue among parties who would otherwise remain disinterested or 
uninvolved. It can lend a human face to an issue or population plagued by stereotypes and 
misperceptions.50 
Despite the importance of visibility for those hoping to change the status quo, she 
emphasizes that high-visibility litigation strategies are also dangerous for vulnerable 
minority groups, fighting an uphill battle in a society in which they are unequal, unpopular, 
and often stigmatized by the majority. This is why unpopular minorities tend to seek 
remedies in court, rather than at the ballot box. But since courts have neither the power of 
the sword nor the purse, to paraphrase Alexander Hamilton’s classic argument about the 
weakness of the judiciary in Federalist No. 78,51  even a favorable ruling from a judge can 
buckle under counter-mobilization from a hostile majority taking advantage of the broader 
electoral process in our political system marked by “institutional pluralism.”52 As Gash 
puts it, “[t]his book starts from the premise that minority rights advocacy, regardless of 
venue or tactics, is always vulnerable to opposition or backlash.”53 By challenging the 
status quo, minorities risk stirring up majority opposition and losing ground. 
A wide range of studies support Gash’s concern about backlash. Perhaps the best-
known work on the topic is Gerald Rosenberg’s influential 1991 book (The Hollow Hope: 
Can Court’s Bring about Social Change?), in which Rosenberg argues that landmark civil 
rights cases—most notably, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and Roe v. Wade 
(1973)—were in many ways counterproductive because they provoked public backlash 
that harmed the very groups and causes they purported to assist, spurring “white flight” in 
the face of racial integration in public schools and politically mobilizing the Christian right 
against abortion.54 Importantly, in contrast to Rosenberg, Gash takes the dangers of 
backlash seriously without discounting the utility of high-visibility tactics to win landmark 
victories through (usually bruising) battles. Her point is not that high-visibility tactics lack 
efficacy when it comes to achieving social change—here she clearly diverges from 
Rosenberg by emphasizing the importance of visibility for marginalized groups seeking to 
spark a national conversation and potentially win over public opinion. Rather, she 
highlights the risks associated with visibility and, most importantly, she argues that there 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 12–23. 
 49. Id. at 13–14. 
 50. Id. at 14. 
 51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 52. GASH, supra note 10, at 12, 204–05 (discussing her concept of “institutional pluralism”). 
 53. Id. at 18. 
 54. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1st 
ed. 1991). 
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are times in which low-visibility tactics are a more effective means to achieve a favorable 
outcome. Gash maintains that the threat of public backlash makes below-the-radar 
strategies a vital, yet widely overlooked, strategy available to social movements. As she 
puts it, “This project focuses on instances where, instead of advancing the privileged, low-
visibility tactics are used to promote reform efforts on behalf of disenfranchised 
communities that are among the most vulnerable.”55 
To support her thesis, Gash offers two interesting case studies of groups using both 
high-visibility and low-visibility tactics in similar policy arenas. This enables her to 
evaluate the efficacy of each approach to visibility. The first compares struggles for same-
sex marriage, which resulted in massive public backlash and setbacks for over two 
decades, to the much more successful and less publicized below-the-radar tactics for 
LGBT parenting equality during the same period. The second focuses on efforts to 
establish group homes for people with disabilities or recovering from addictions under the 
threat of local NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard) neighborhood backlash, comparing the 
success rates of low and high visibility tactics. Each case study is compelling and 
informative. Gash supports her analysis of grassroots organizing and litigation strategies 
with interviews of advocates and judges. She also examines public opinion polls and media 
coverage to gauge popular awareness and support/opposition of these efforts. For the 
purposes of this review, I focus on her study of parenting equality, because it begins with 
a compelling puzzle, which connects to the opening “big politics” case of Obergefell 
(2015). In particular, Gash compares the twenty years of devastating losses and bruising 
battles over same-sex marriage, which changed tide only recently, to favorable court 
rulings supporting lesbian and gay parenting, which happened during the same time as the 
explosive backlash against marriage.56 As she frames this puzzle: Given that gay and 
lesbian parenting directly challenges the anti-gay family values agenda at least as much as 
marriage, “How can we explain these two contemporaneous and yet divergent responses 
to same-sex family litigation?”57 
Gash’s answer highlights different approaches to visibility.58 The same-sex 
marriage movement followed the familiar path of high-visibility litigation sparking public 
backlash, but the parenting movement did not. Although we now know that the same-sex 
marriage story has a happy ending, Gash emphasizes that “the politics of same-sex 
marriage have been as volatile as they are visible.”59 All the state Supreme Court of Hawaii 
had to do was “venture[] toward legalizing marriage equality for same sex- couples” in 
Baehr v. Lewin decision in 1993,60 and the issue of same-sex marriage became one of the 
most controversial hot-button issues in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.61 
                                                          
 55. GASH, supra note 10, at 15. 
 56. Id. at 2–3. 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. Id. at 104–09. In defense of low-visibility, Gash shows that Public opinion cannot explain these divergent 
outcomes. According to opinion polls, the public was equally opposed to both same-sex marriage and lesbians 
and gay men parenting. And one of the most prominent arguments against same-sex marriage was that it would 
legitimize lesbian and gay parenting, suggesting that the opposition to marriage was rooted in the aim of 
preventing “homosexuals” from raising children. Id. 
 59. Id. at 52. 
 60. GASH, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)). 
 61. Id. at 60. 
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Responding to massive conservative backlash against Baehr, Congress passed, and 
President Bill Clinton signed the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, 
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples federally and allowing states to refuse to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.62 Furthermore, between 1996 and 
2006, after Massachusetts granted same-sex couples the right to marry in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,63 “same-sex marriage had been banned either by statute or 
constitutional amendment in more than forty states.”64 Yet in the shadow of the fury over 
marriage equality, Gash draws our attention to an “equally significant,” but “much less 
publicly contested” set of decisions validating same-sex families and parenting.65 During 
the same period of time, in a series of below-the-radar cases across the country within local 
family courts, lesbian and gay parents were regularly granted custody of their biological 
children and able to adopt despite their homosexuality. 
This brings us to Gash’s main point. Whereas marriage litigation was unavoidably 
visible, Gash notes that parenting litigation was structurally and strategically different: “in 
many ways the issue of same sex parenting lends itself to (or even calls for) low visibility 
advocacy” and this “was critical to its success.”66 The first wave of LGBT parenting 
litigation involved homosexual biological parents (mostly mothers) fighting divorcing 
spouses in family court to retain custody of their children.67 Given the risk of potentially 
losing custody of their children, the parenting movement deliberately developed “specific 
below-the-radar strategies to avoid any publicity that would thwart their progress.”68 Since 
the cases arose in local family courts, they were handled on a case-by-case manner and 
records were usually sealed from the public. Attorneys urged judges to focus on their 
client’s parenting skills (not their homosexuality), and grounded legal arguments on 
traditional heterosexual statutory law, which emphasized “the best interests of the child.”69 
When the next phase of the parenting movement turned to adoption in the 1980s, 
“advocates stuck to the…incremental, low-visibility approach employed in early parenting 
cases involving homosexual parents.”70 Prominent national gay rights advocacy 
organizations supported litigation efforts from behind-the-scenes. They were careful to 
remove their names from briefs and to avoid making fancy new rights claims that could 
spur public opposition. Lawyers sought to educate judges about the issue and brought cases 
to judges who indicated they were sympathetic.71 They steered clear of politicizing 
decisions and intentionally did not challenge them in higher appellate court.72 Keeping a 
low-profile, activists engaged in nationwide sharing of tactics by word of mouth, seeking 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 62 (discussing Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–99, 110 Stat. 2419, later partially 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)). 
 63. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass 2003). 
 64. GASH, supra note 10, at 66–67. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 110, 111. 
 67. Id. at 99. 
 68. Id. at 110. 
 69. GASH, supra note 10, at 98–102. 
 70. Id. at 102. 
 71. Id. at 112–17. 
 72. Id. at 115, 120. 
11
Wilson: Stealth Battles over Civil Rights: Two Approaches to Low-Visibili
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018
WILSON, E-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019  3:29 PM 
364 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:353 
to “incrementally develop positive precedent without politicizing their efforts.”73 With 
low levels of public engagement or opposition, the parenting movement outpaced the 
marriage movement, and Gash persuasively argue that its success hinged on staying 
largely outside the public eye. 
This is an important book. In documenting examples of activists using stealth tactics 
to achieve major victories outside the public eye, Gash makes a novel contribution to the 
literature on civil rights, public policy, and social movements more broadly. Her evidence 
is persuasive, and her case studies of “stealth” civil rights tactics are nuanced and 
engaging. While scholarly debate over the efficacy of civil rights litigation tends to focus 
almost exclusively on the risks and benefits of conventional (visible) methods of litigation, 
Gash argues that there is another less visible way for civil rights to advance, which includes 
incremental “below the radar” litigation strategies in local and civil courtrooms. In this 
regard, Gash draws our attention to what we, as scholars of law and politics, have known 
but often tend to forget or overlook (in the name of the allure of “big politics”): Social 
movements are hard work.74 High-profile Supreme Court victories like Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) are covered in history books, but it is the multiplicity of strategies, 
venues, activism, and protest that together pave the way towards to social change. The 
African American Civil Rights Movement depended upon decades (arguably centuries) of 
small, frequently low-visibility, acts of civil disobedience and local heroism, in addition 
to both low-visibility and high-visibility organizing by civil rights organizations like the 
NAACP and leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.75 There is a sense in which the 
narrative of high-profile litigation—which has become conventional wisdom in the 
aftermath of the rights revolution—distracts us from the mundane, painful, and time-
consuming reality of the behind-the-scenes activism driving these movements. 
The recent success of the same-sex marriage movement strongly supports this point. 
Although Gash wrote this book before Obergefell in 2015, the landmark ruling bolsters 
her thesis by revealing a vital political connection between the same-sex parenting and 
marriage movements. During the two decades of public backlash against gay marriage, the 
most popular argument defending federal and state bans against same-sex marriage rested 
on the premise that heterosexuals were more suitable parents than homosexuals. However, 
as Gash emphasizes, decades of behind the scenes victories in local family courts across 
the country meant that same-sex parents had legally adopted thousands upon thousands of 
children, functioning as formal family units. By changing the facts on the ground, this 
pulled the rug out from under the opposition. Consider Justice Kennedy’s discussion of 
same-sex families in the majority opinion in Obergefell: 
[M]any same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether 
biological or adopted . . . . Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage 
offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They 
also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 111. 
 74. See SYDNEY G. TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 75. See ALDON D. MORIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES 
ORGANIZAING FOR CHANGE (1986); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK 
INSURGENCY, 1930-1970 (2d ed. 1999). 
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through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws 
at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same sex couples.76 
As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in Obergefell, the parenting movement had already 
altered the legal rules and social norms defining the American family. The incremental 
(behind-the-scenes) work of the parenting movement helped pave the way for this future 
same-sex marriage victory, suggesting that low and high visibility strategies can work 
together to achieve major victories in the court. 
Gash’s major contribution to the literature is to remind us about the less glamorous, 
yet politically just as important, below-the-radar strategies used by civil rights advocates 
seeking to advance the status of vulnerable minorities in America today. However, while 
Gash offers a superb analysis of two case studies of social movements pursuing low-
visibility strategies to bring about social change, I would have liked to see her address the 
way in which low and high visibility strategies interact in greater detail. Gash mentions 
that low and high visibility tactics can and often do work together in complementary 
fashion (a point captured above in my discussion of Obergefell), but in what ways does 
this happen within a broader social movement? When do advocates for civil rights 
intentionally pursue low-visibility tactics? Are certain issues better suited to benefit from 
low-visibility tactics? If so, what features determine this and why? Gash offers two 
excellent examples of below-the-radar strategies advancing the rights of LGBT parents 
and group homes for people with disabilities, but by identifying this oft-overlooked 
phenomenon, she raises as many questions as she answers. The exciting news is that she 
opens doors for future scholarship in this area, which is an indication of the impressive 
breadth and achievement of this book. 
CONCLUSION 
I opened this review with Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) because this recent Supreme 
Court case sparked renewed discussion about the “rights revolution” and American 
society. But, as Staszak and Gash persuasively demonstrate, focusing our attention 
(disproportionately) on blockbuster cases like Obergefell leaves out a vital dimension of 
the politics of civil rights today. The two books both address an important issue from 
different angles: What is the relationship between visibility and civil rights? In doing so, 
they assume that litigation can contribute to meaningful social change, but also challenge 
the assumption that the primary or sole way of doing so is through high visibility litigation. 
By highlighting the subterranean realm of civil rights and challenging traditional 
assumptions about the role of visibility in rights litigation associated with the rights 
revolution, these books remind us that the power of rights is about what they do, as a 
practical matter, rather than their symbolic allure.77 Importantly, while each author 
examines stealth battles over civil rights from a radically different angle, there is nothing 
fundamentally inconsistent about these two studies; with Staszak focusing on elites in 
government undermining access to courts (from above) and Gash examining grassroots 
activists advancing the rights of vulnerable groups (from below). In different ways and 
                                                          
 76. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600–01 (2015). 
 77. See, e.g., STUART A. SHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE (2d ed., 1974). 
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using different research methods, both Gash and Staszak argue that—despite the brute 
reality that politics today is dominated by “hyper-visibility” and “big political events”—
the subterranean politics of rights can be just as important as blockbuster cases. These 
books are timely reminders of a more complex landscape shaping the politics of civil rights 
advocacy during a time in which many vulnerable minority groups are facing renewed 
backlash under “Trumpian populism.” Moving forward, scholars and advocates alike 
would be wise to take the subterranean politics of civil rights seriously in their judicial 
efforts to bring about meaningful social change for vulnerable groups in America. 
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